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We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strate-
gies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior.
We find interesting scaling relations with diversity for the variance of decisions. When diversity
increases, the scaling dynamics is modified by kinetic sampling and waiting mechanisms.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.70.Ln, 87.23.Ge, 64.60.Ht
Many natural and artificial systems involve interacting
agents, each making independent decisions to compete
for limited resources, but globally exhibit coordinated be-
havior through their mutual adaptation [1, 2]. Examples
include the competition of predators in ecology, buyers
or sellers in economic markets, and routers in computer
networks. While a standard approach is to analyse the
steady state behavior of the system described by the Nash
equilibria [3], it is interesting to consider the dynamics
of how the steady state is approached. Dynamical stud-
ies are especially relevant when one considers the effects
of changing enviroment, such as those in economics or
distributed control.
The recently proposed Minority Games (MG) are pro-
totypes of such multi-agent systems [2]. The dynamical
nature of the adaptive processes is revealed when the
complexity of the agents is low, where the final states de-
pend on the initial conditions [4, 5]. Here, the system ex-
hibits large fluctuations, which are caused by the initially
zero preference of strategies for all agents. However,
when the game is used to model economic systems, it
is not realistic to expect that all agents enter the market
with the same preference. Besides, in games which use
public information only, this imply that different agents
would maintain identical preferences of strategies at all
subsequent steps, which is again unlikely. Furthermore,
when the game is used to model distributed control in
multi-agent systems, identical preferences of strategies of
the agents lead to maladaptative behavior, which refers to
the bursts of the population’s decisions due to their pre-
mature rush to certain state, compromising the system
efficiency [6, 7]. There were attempts of improvement by
introducing thermal noise [8], biased starts [9, 10], bias
strategies [11], and random initial conditions [5]. How-
ever, no systematic studies have been made.
In this Letter, we consider the effects of introducing
randomness in the initial preferences of strategies among
the agents, focusing on the regime of low complexity,
where analyses assuming vanishing step sizes are not ap-
plicable [4, 9]. Concretely, we consider a population of N
agents competing in an environment of limited resources,
N being odd [2]. Each agent makes a decision + or −
at each time step, and the minority group wins. The de-
cisions of each agent are prescribed by strategies, which
are Boolean functions mapping the history of the win-
ning bits in the most recent m steps to decisions + or
−. Before the game starts, each agent randomly picks s
strategies. Out of her s strategies, each agent makes de-
cisions according to the most successful one at each step;
the success of a strategy is measured by its virtual point,
which increases (decreases) by 1 if it indicates a winning
(losing) decision at a time step.
In contrast to early versions of the game, the agents
may enter the game with diverse preferences of their
strategies. This is done by randomly assigning R vir-
tual points to the s strategies of each agent before the
game starts. Hence the initial virtual point of each strat-
egy obeys a multinomial distribution with mean R/s and
variance R(s − 1)/s2. The ratio ρ ≡ R/N is referred to
as the diversity. In particular, for s = 2 and odd R, no
two strategies have the same virtual points throughout
the game, and the dynamics of the game is determinis-
tic, resulting in highly precise simulation results useful
for refined comparison with theories.
To describe the macroscopic dynamics of the system,
we define the D-dimensional vector Aµ(t), which is the
sum of the decisions of all agents responding to history
µ of their strategies, normalized by N , where D ≡ 2m is
the number of histories. While only one of the D com-
ponents corresponds to the historical state µ∗(t) of the
system, the augmentation to D components is necessary
to describe the attractor structure and the transient be-
havior of the system dynamics. The inset of Fig. 1 il-
lustrates the convergence to the attractor for the visu-
alizable case of m = 1. The dynamics proceeds in the
direction which tends to reduce the magnitude of the
components of Aµ(t) [4]. However, a certain amount of
maladaptation always exists in the system, so that the
components of Aµ(t) overshoot, resulting in periodic at-
tractors with period of 2D. Every state µ appears as his-
torical states two times in a steady-state period, yielding
the winning bits − and + each exactly once. One oc-
curence brings Aµ from positive to negative, and another
bringing it back from negative to positive, thus complet-
ing a cycle. For m = 1, the steady state is described by
the sequence µ(t) = −,+,+,−, where both states − and
+ are followed by − and + once each. For general values
of m, the states in an attractor are given by a binary de
Brujin sequence of order m+ 1 [12].
As shown in Fig. 1, the variance σ2/N of the popula-
tion for decision + scales as a function of the complexity
α ≡ D/N , agreeing with previous observations [6]. When
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FIG. 1: The dependence of the variance of the population for
decision + on the complexity for different diversities at s = 2
averaged over 128 samples. The horizontal dotted line is the
limit of random decisions. Inset: the state motion of a sample
in the phase space for m = 1. Solid dots: attractor states.
α is small, games with increasing complexity create time
series of decreasing fluctuations. A phase transition takes
place around αc ≈ 0.3, after which it increases gradu-
ally to the limit of random decisions, with σ2/N = 0.25.
When α < αc, we have the symmetric phase, in which
the occurences of decisions 1 and 0 responding to a given
historical state µ are equal, whereas in the asymmetric
phase above αc, the occurences are biased for at least
some history µ [13]. Figure 1 also shows the data collapse
for different N for ρ ∼ 1, indicating that the variance is
a function of ρ. It is observed that the variance decreases
significantly with diversity in the symmetric phase, and
remains unaffected in the asymmetric phase.
The dependence of the variance on the diversity is fur-
ther shown in Fig. 2 for given memory sizes m. Here we
focus on the physical picture of the dynamics [14]. Four
regimes can be identified:
(a) Multinomial regime. When ρ ∼ N−1, σ2/N ∼ N
with proportionality constants dependent onm. To anal-
yse this and other regimes, we let Sαβ(ω) be the num-
ber of agents holding strategies α and β (with α < β),
and the virtual point of strategy α is initially displaced
by ω with respect to β. The average of Sαβ(ω) over ini-
tial condition is proportional to the binomial distribution
of virtual points, i.e., 〈Sαβ(ω)〉 = NCR(R−ω)/2/22D−1+R.
The key to analysing the system dynamics is the obser-
vation that the virtual points of a strategy displace by
exactly the same amount for all agents. Hence for a given
strategy pair, the profile of the virtual point distribution
remains unchanged, but the peak position shifts with
the game dynamics. If the virtual point displacement
of strategy α at time t is Ωα(t), then the agents holding
strategies α and β make decisions according to strategy
α if ω+Ωα(t)−Ωβ(t) > 0, and strategy β otherwise. At
time t, we can write Ωα(t) =
∑
µ kµ(t)ξ
µ
α, where kµ(t)
is the number of wins minus losses of decision + up to
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FIG. 2: The dependence of the variance of the population
for decision + on the diversity at m = 1 and s = 2. Symbols:
simulation results averaged over 1024 samples. Lines: theory.
Dashed-dotted line: scaling prediction. Inset: Comparison
between simulation results (symbols), theory with waiting ef-
fects included (lines) and excluded (dashed lines).
time t when the game responded to history µ. Consider
the difference Aµ(t) − Aµ(0) = 1N
∑
α<β Sαβ(ω)(ξ
µ
α −
ξµβ )[θ(ω + Ωα(t) − Ωβ(t)) − θ(ω)]. Its average can be
found by introducing the average 〈Sαβ(ω)〉, writing the
step function as a sum over Kronecka deltas and intro-
ducing their integral representation, using the identity
eikθ(ξ
µ
α−ξ
µ
β
) = cos2 kθ+i sinkθ cos θ(ξµα−ξµβ )+sin2 kθξµαξµβ ,
and noting that
∑
α ξ
µ
α = 0. The final result is
〈Aµ(t)−Aµ(0)〉 = 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dθ cosR θ
sin kµ(t)θ
sin θ
× coskµ(t)θ
∏
ν 6=µ
cos2 kν(t)θ. (1)
When ρ ∼ N−1, 〈Aµ(t + 1) − Aµ(t)〉 ∼ O(1) and is
self-averaging. Since Aµ(0) is Gaussian with variance
N−1, the values of Aµ(t) at the attractors can be com-
puted, and the variance found. For example, for m = 1,
σ2/N ≡ N〈[Aµ∗(t)(t) − 〈Aµ∗(t)(t)〉]2〉/4 = N [7(cR+1)2 −
2cR+1cR+3 + 7(cR+3)
2], where cn = 2
−nCnn/2 for even
integer n.
(b) Scaling regime. When ρ ∼ 1, σ2/N ∼ ρ−1 with
proportionality constants effectively independent of m
for m not too large. In this case, Eq. (1) can be sim-
plified to 〈Aµ(t) − Aµ(0)〉 = kµ(t)
√
2/piR. The average
step size becomes 〈Aµ(t+1)−Aµ(t)〉 =
√
2/piRδµµ∗(t) ∼
O(N−
1
2 ) and is self-averaging. To interpret this result,
we note that changes in Aµ(t) are only contributed by
fickle agents with marginal preferences of their strate-
gies. That is, those with ω + Ωα(t) − Ωβ(t) = ±1 and
ξµα− ξµβ = ∓2sgnAµ(t) for µ = µ∗(t). For large R, the bi-
nomial virtual point distribution among agents of a given
strategy pair is effectively a Gaussian with variance R.
3Hence the number of agents switching strategies at time
t scales as the height of the Gaussian distribution, which
is
√
2/piR. Thus, by spreading the virtual point distribu-
tion, diversity reduces the step size and hence maladap-
tation.
As a result, each state of the attractor is confined in
a D-dimensional hypercube of size
√
2/piR, irrespective
of the initial position of the Aµ components. Starting
from the initial state Aµ(0), the state changes in steps
of size
√
2/piR until it reaches the attractor, whose 2D
historical states are given by
√
2/piR⌈
√
piR/2Aµ(0)⌉ and√
2/piR{⌈
√
piR/2Aµ(0)⌉ − 1}, where ⌈x⌉ represents the
decimal part of x. Averaging over Aµ(0), which are
Gaussian numbers with mean 0 and variance 1/N , the
variance of decisions become σ2/N = f(ρ)/2piρ, where
f(ρ) approaches (1 − 1/4D)/3 for ρ ≫ 1. Note that
f(ρ) is a smooth function of ρ, since σ2/N depends on ρ
mainly through the step size factor 1/2piρ, whereas f(ρ)
merely provides a higher order correction to the func-
tional dependence. This accounts for the scaling regime
in Fig. 2. Furthermore, we note that f(ρ) rapidly ap-
proaches 1/3 when m increases. Hence for general values
of m, σ2/N → 1/6piρ, provided that m is not too large.
(c) Kinetic sampling regime. When ρ ∼ N , σ2/N
deviates above the scaling with ρ−1, and is given by
σ2/N = fm(∆)/N , where ∆ ≡
√
2N/piρ is the kinetic
step size, and fm is a function dependent on the mem-
ory size m. Here Aµ(t + 1) − Aµ(t) scales as N−1 and
is no longer self-averaging. Rather, it is equal to 2/N
times the number of agents who switch strategies at time
t, which is Poisson distributed with a mean of
√
2/piR.
However, since the attractor is formed by steps which
reverse the sign of Aµ, the average step size in the at-
tractor is larger than that in the transient state. To see
this, we consider the probability of Patt(∆A) of step sizes
∆A in the attractor. Assuming that all states of the
phase space are equally likely to be accessed, we have
Patt(∆A) =
∑
A
Patt(∆A,A), where Patt(∆A,A) is the
probability of finding the position A with displacement
∆A in the attractor. Consider the example of m = 1 in
the inset of Fig. 1. The sign reversal condition implies
that Patt(∆A,A) = PPoi(∆A)
∏
µ θ[−Aµ(Aµ + ∆Aµ)],
where PPoi(∆A) is the Poisson distribution of step
sizes, yielding Patt(∆A) = PPoi(∆A)
∏
µ∆A
µ. Thus
the attractor averages 〈(∆A±)2〉att, which are required
for computing the variance of decisions, are given by
〈(∆A±)2∆A+∆A−〉Poi/〈∆A+∆A−〉Poi. In other words,
the sampling of the step sizes is weighted by the attrac-
tor sizes due to the kinetics. The result for m = 1 is
σ2/N = (14∆3 + 105∆2 + 132∆+ 24)/96N(2∆+ 1).
(d) Waiting regime. When ρ ≫ N , σ2/N deviates
above the predictions of kinetic sampling. Here the
agents are so diverse that the average step size is ap-
proaching 0. At each state in the phase space, the sys-
tem remains stationary for many time steps, waiting for
some agent to reduce the magnitude of her virtual point
until strategy switching can take place. This waiting ef-
fect modifies the composition of the group of fickle agents
who contribute to the state transitions, and consequently
increase the step sizes and variance above those predicted
by kinetic sampling. Consider the example of m = 1. As
shown in the inset of Fig. 1, the attractor consists of both
vertical and horizontal hops, and detailed analysis shows
that only one type of agents can complete both hops.
Since fewer and fewer agents contribute to the switching
of states in the limit ρ ≫ N , a single agent of this type
will dominate the game dynamics, and one would expect
that σ2/N approaches 1/4N . However, when waiting is
possible, agents not of this correct type can wait for other
agents to complete the hops in the attractor, even though
one would expect that the probability of finding more
than one fickle agents is drastically less than that for
one. In fact, analysis shows that the attractor consists of
a single fickle agent with a probability of 1/11 only, and
σ2/N approaches 9/22N rather than 1/4N . As shown
in the inset of Fig. 2, lengthy analytic results including
waiting effects significantly improve the agreement with
simulations over the kinetic sampling prediction.
Many properties of the system dependent on the tran-
sient dynamics also depend on its diversity. For example,
since diversity reduces the fraction of agents switching
strategies at each time step, it also slows down the con-
vergence to the steady state. Hence in the scaling regime,
the convergence time scales as ρ1/2. Specifically, when
ρ≫ 1, the average convergence time becomes (2+√2)√ρ
for m = 1. Similarly, the distribution of payoffs among
the frozen agents (that is, agents who do not switch their
strategies at the steady state) also depends on the tran-
sient. Since the system dynamics reaches a periodic at-
tractor, they have constant average payoffs at the steady
state. Hence any spread in their payoff distribution is a
consequence of the transient dynamics. Thus, in the scal-
ing regime, the mean square payoff scales as ρ. Specifi-
cally, when ρ≫ 1, the mean square payoff becomes piρ for
m = 1. Simulation results of both the convergence time
and the mean square payoff have an excellent agreement
with the theory [14].
The results presented here can be generalized to other
cases. Consider the exogenousMG, in which the informa-
tion µ(t) was randomly and independently drawn at each
time step t [4]. The picture that the states of the game
are hopping between hypercubes in the phase space re-
mains valid. At the steady state, the attractor consists of
hoppings among all vertices of a hyperpolygon enclosing
the origin in the phase space, analogous to the present
endogenous case, in which a fraction of hyperpolygon ver-
tices belong to the attractor. In the scaling regime, the
behavior depends on the scaling of the step sizes with
diversity, rather than the actual sequence of the steps.
Consequently, the behavior is similar to that of the en-
dogenous game.
The present results can be extended to higher values
of m [14]. For m = 2, analysis using the de Bruijn se-
quence explicitly yields excellent results. For higher m,
we approximate the attractor of the exogenous game by
4a hyperpolygon enclosing the origin of the phase space.
Using a generating function approach, and taking into
account the scaling of step sizes and kinetic sampling,
the computed variance of decisions agrees qualitatively
with simulations, except for values of α close to αc.
We can also make qualitative predictions about the
transition from the symmetric to asymmetric phase when
the complexity α increases [13]. From Eq. (1), the aver-
age displacement in the phase space is given by
〈Aµ(t)−Aµ(0)〉 ≈ kµ(t)
√
2
pi(R + 2D〈k2〉) , (2)
where 〈k2〉 represents the mean of kν(t)2 for all ν ≤ D.
For ρ ∼ α ∼ 1, it can be verified that Aµ(t) − Aµ(0)
is self-averaging. Suppose the game dynamics leads to
an attractor near the origin, with 〈Aµ(t)〉 → 0. Noting
that 〈Aµ(0)2〉 ∼ 1/N , we obtain the self-consistent rela-
tion 〈k2〉 = ρ/2(αc − α), where αc = 1/pi ≈ 0.318. This
means that when α approaches αc, the average step size
appraoches 0 in the asymptotic limit. There is a critical
slow down since the convergence time diverges. When
α exceeds αc, the average step size vanishes before the
system reaches the attractor near the origin, so that the
state of the system is trapped at locations with at least
some components being nonzero. The interpretation is
that when α is large, the distributions of strategies be-
come so sparse that motions in the phase space cannot
be achieved by the switching of strategies. Note that the
value of αc is close to the value of 0.337 obtained by the
continuum approximation [4] or batch update [9].
From the perspective of game theory, it is natural to
consider whether the introduction of diversity assists the
game to reach a Nash equilibrium. It has been veri-
fied that Nash equilibria consist of pure strategies [4].
Hence all frozen agents have no incentives to switch their
strategies. In fact, since the dynamics in the attractor is
periodic, the payoffs of all strategies become zero when
averaged over a period. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is
approached in the sense that the fraction of fickle agents
decreases with increasing diversity. In the extremely
diverse limit, it is probable that only one fickle agent
switches strategy at each step in the attractor. In this
case, even the fickle agent cannot increase her payoff,
since on switching she always remains on the majority
side and loses. Then a Nash equilibrium is reached ex-
actly. For m = 1, for example, a Nash equilibrium is
reached in this way with probability 7/11.
In summary, we have studied the effects of diversity in
the initial preference of strategies on a game with adap-
tive agents competing for finite resources. Scaling of step
sizes accounts for the behavior of the variance of deci-
sions in the scaling regime (ρ ∼ 1). At high diversity,
we find that the scaling mechanism is supplemented by
kinetic sampling, a mechanism self-imposed by the re-
quirement to stay in the attractor. In extremely diverse
systems, we discover further a waiting mechanism, when
agents who are unable to complete the attractor dynam-
ics alone wait for other agents to collaborate with them.
Together, these mechanisms yield theoretical predictions
with excellent agreement with simulations over 9 decades
of data. By introducing diversity, the variance of deci-
sions in the symmetric phase decreases, showing that the
maladaptive behavior is reduced.
The combination of scaling, kinetic sampling and wait-
ing in accounting for the steady state properties of the
system illustrates the importance of dynamical consid-
erations in describing the system behavior. We antici-
pate that these dynamical effects will play a crucial role
in explaining the system behavior in the entire symmet-
ric phase, since when α increases, the state motion in a
high dimensional phase space can easily shift the tail of
the virtual point distributions to the verge of strategy
switching, leading to the sparseness condition where ki-
netic sampling and waiting effects are relevant. Due to
the generic nature of these effects, we expect that they are
relevant to minority games with different payoff functions
and updating rules, as well as other multi-agent systems.
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